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Abstract
The paper empirically studies why the sellers of identical commodities adopt differ-
ent auction formats in the online auction, and the consequences thereof. We postulate
that the sellers adopt different auction formats because of the differences in their ex-
perience and the number of items they have. We first use these two characteristics to
endogeneize the seller’s choice between three auction formats: fixed-price, buy-it-now
(BIN), and pure auctions. We then estimate the differences in sales rate, transaction
price, and sale duration between the three formats. We find that the fixed-price auc-
tion results in the highest transaction price and the lowest sale rate, while the pure
auction is just the opposite, with the BIN auction falling in between. These results
strongly suggest that there is a tradeoff between price and sale probability in adopting
different formats of auctions.
∗We thank Ching-I Huang and Jong-Rong Chen for their useful comments and suggestions.
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1 Introduction
The development of the Internet has made online auction one of the most important forms
of C2C transactions. Its fast development has also made it into a full-scale research area.1
The research on online auctions has mainly focused on the bidder’s behavior under various
transaction rules.2 Research on the seller’s behavior, either theoretical or empirical, is rel-
atively scarce. Even less studied is the seller’s strategic choice between various transaction
formats available to them.
There are basically two formats by which the sellers can list their items in the online
auctions: The auction format and the buy-it-now (BIN) format. In the former, the seller
lists an item with or without reserve price, and the highest bidder (at the end of auction)
wins the item. We will call this the “pure auction” in this paper. There are two types of
auctions under the BIN format. In the first, the seller sets a BIN price (only), and the buyers
are not allowed to bid. Within the posted duration of the auction, any buyer can click the
buy-it-now button and obtain the item with the BIN price. This is equivalent to a fixed-price
format, and in this paper we will call it a “fixed-price auction”. Under the second type of
BIN format, the bidders are allowed not only to buy out the item with BIN price, but also
to place competitive bids. In this paper we will call this the “BIN auction”. It is important
to note that in the eBay auctions, the BIN option is temporary: Once a bidder places a bid
before any bidder buys out the item with BIN price, the BIN option will disappear, and the
1 As far as we know, there have already been five surveys of online auctions in less than a decade. See
Bajari and Hortac¸su (2004), Ockelfels et al. (2006), Pinker et al. (2003), Hasker and Sickles (2010) and
Haruvy and Ropkowski Leszczyc (2009). There has also been an early partial survey by Lucking-Reiley
(2000).
2 For example, see Roth and Ockelfels (2002) and Ockenfels and Roth (2006) on sniping, and Budish and
Takeyama (2001), Hidvegi et al. (2006), Reynolds and Wooders (2009) and Chen et al. (2011) on bidding
strategy under buy-it-now. Though not a bidder’s strategy per se, readers interested in shill bidding can see
Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004) and Engelberg and Williams (2009).
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auction will then become a pure auction.3, 4
In this paper, we empirically investigate the following questions: Given the array of selling
formats available to them, how do the sellers choose one over the others, and what are the
consequences of the choice? Is there a certain tradeoff between adopting these formats, so
that the seller’s choice is essentially a balance of the tradeoff? We suggest answers to these
questions by analyzing data from the eBay auctions of Apple iPods. We focus on three types
of online sale format mentioned above: the pure auction, the auction with buy-it-now, and
the fixed-price auction. We hypothesize, and confirm with data, that the main determinant
of the sellers’ choice between a fixed-price format and the open-price format (the pure and
BIN auctions) is their experience as Internet sellers. More experienced sellers, having greater
ability to set the optimal price according to their own and the item’s characteristics and the
market conditions, are more likely to use the fixed-price format to sell their commodities.
We therefore use the seller’s experience to endogenize his decision of whether to list his item
in fixed-price format.
Regarding the adoption of BIN, current theory suggests that the main reason for a seller
to use BIN in an auction is to reduce price risk.5 Therefore, we hypothesize (and confirm
with data) that the main determinant of a seller’s decision to adopt BIN auction is his risk
3 The readers are cautioned of the use of terminology in our paper. Since eBay facilitates a fixed-price
purchase with BIN in which the buyers are not allowed to place bids, what we call the “fixed-price” auction
in this paper is called a BIN auction in some other papers (e.g., Hasker and Sickles, 2010). Also, although
fixed-price format is not an auction per se, we call it a fixed-price “auction” for the sake of convenience in
explanation. Finally, eBay now does not allow a seller to list an item as a BIN auction, and at the same
time sets a starting bid equal to BIN price (which essentially makes it into a fixed-price auction). But at
the time we collected our data, it was still possible to do this. Therefore, in our data we have checked the
auctions with BIN whether their starting bids equal to BIN prices and, if yes, categorize them as a fixed-price
auctions.
4 There is also a variation of BIN auction, the best-offer auction, in which the seller posts a BIN price,
and the potential buyers can negotiate the terms in a formalized procedure designed by eBay. There are,
however, still few items for which best-offer option is available. Moreover, the offers of both sides during
negotiation are not observable to the third party. Therefore, we do not include best-offer auctions in our
study.
5 See Hidvegi et al. (2006), Mathews and Katzman (2006), Reynolds and Wooders (2009), and Chen et
al. (2011).
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consideration. Specifically, a seller who has more listings of iPods can diversify price risk
through repeated transactions. As a result, he is less likely to list the objects with BIN. We
therefore use the seller’s number of listings in our study period to endogenize his decision of
whether to post his listing in a BIN auction.
In terms of auction results, we show that among the three formats, the fixed price auction
has the lowest transaction probability, while the BIN and pure auctions have about the same
sales rate. Furthermore, the fixed-price auction has the highest transaction price if the item
results in a sale, followed by the BIN auction, and then pure auction. The results therefore
imply that there does not exist a dominant auction format. While fixed-price auction results
in the highest transaction price, it has the lowest sale rate. Furthermore, although the pure
auction has the highest sale probability, it is at the cost of having the lowest transaction price
among all auction formats. The pattern is quite clear: The pure auction and the fixed-price
auction are polar opposites to each other in transaction rates and transaction price, with
one format having the highest in one transaction result and the lowest in the other, and the
other format just the opposite. The BIN auction falls in the middle in both transaction rate
and price. Our result is therefore consistent with the findings in the theoretical literature
that the function of BIN is to reduce risk (e.g., Hidvegi et al., 2006, Mathews and Katzman,
2006, Reynolds and Wooders, 2009, and Chen at al., 2011).
Note that although the seller’s consideration is mainly about the tradeoff between sale
probability and price, he also takes other factors into account. Our duration regression
shows that, if we control for the duration that the seller posts,6 then the BIN and fixed-price
auctions take about the same time to reach a sale, and are shorter than the pure auction.
However, if we do not control for the seller’s posted duration, then the fixed-price auction
6 There are two types of duration for an auction. The “posted duration” is the duration (in terms of
number of days) that the seller sets when he lists an item. The “sale duration” is the actual number of days
that an item takes to be sold (if there is a transaction).
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has the longest duration, followed by the pure auction, and the BIN auction is the shortest.
Therefore, the empirical result is also consistent with the theoretical explanation that one
of the functions of BIN is to satisfy the buyer’s time-impatience (Mathews, 2004).
The literature on the seller’s choice of online auction format has been scarce. An early
paper by Wang (1993), which is not specifically related to online transactions, compares
fixed-price and pure auctions in terms of the dispersion of the bidders’ valuations. If the
seller has one unit of the commodity to sell, he shows that pure auction outperforms fixed-
price auction when the bidders’ valuations are more dispersed. Etzion et al. (2006) consider a
monopolistic online seller who offers identical items using both posted price and auction (i.e.,
fixed-price and pure auctions in our paper) simultaneously. They build up a dynamic model
in which buyers arrive stochastically. The monopolist sets auction duration, quantity of items
in auction, and the posted price to maximize revenue per unit of time. It is shown that this
dual channel selling strategy can segment buyers, with the auction used to capture buyers
who are priced out in the fixed-price format. Their simulation shows that sometimes the
dual channel selling can substantially outperform a lone fixed-price venue. Bose and Daripa
(2009) consider a traditional store owner who can pay an online auction access fee to also sell
his commodities simultaneously. They show that the optimal mechanism involves a fixed
price at the store plus an online auction in which only high-valuation buyers participate.
They also show that this optimal mechanism corresponds exactly to the eBay-type BIN
auction.
We are aware of only three related empirical works. Vakrat and Seidmann (1999) compare
prices in the online auctions and the corresponding catalog prices for identical goods,7 and
find that the auction price is 25% lower than the catalog price. They explain the difference by
7 Specifically, they compare online auction prices on SurplusAuction with prices on its catalog-based site
Egghtead.com. They also compare auction prices at the online auction site OnSale with search results of
prices on the web using a shopping agent.
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the monitoring, delay, and search costs that online auctions bidders have to incur. However,
their comparison is between online and catalog prices, not the prices between two formats
in the same online auction site. Anderson et al. (2008) use eBay auction data of Palm
Vx PDAs to investigate the seller’s motivation of using BIN, together with its consequence.
They show that BIN option is more likely to be adopted by sellers with higher ratings
and fewer units.8 Moreover, the fixed-price format is more likely to be adopted for used
items. They also find that auctions with BIN do not result in higher prices, although in the
subsample where BIN options are offered, those in which the bidders win with BIN result
in higher prices. Their model is mainly concerned with the seller’s adoption of BIN, rather
than to distinguish the three formats considered in our paper. They also do not consider
the endogeneity problem of the sellers’ choices. Finally, in a highly related paper, Hammond
(2010) uses eBay auction data of compact discs to compare fixed-price and pure auctions,
and finds that fixed-price goods sell for a higher price, and that pure auction results in
higher sale probability. Consistent with our empirical result, he also finds that the sellers
with large inventories are more likely to adopt the fixed-price format. Our paper, however,
also investigates the BIN auction, together with the sellers’ incentive to adopt it.
It should be emphasized that the paper is concerned with the seller’s choice of auction
formats for identical objects. Therefore, we are seeking explanations which depend not on
product characteristics,9 but rather on the seller’s characteristics. This differentiates our
study from Anderson et al. (2008), who also consider how product characteristics affect
choice of auction format. Finally, we consider the situation in which the sellers choose
auction formats within the same venue. This differentiates our study from those in which
the sellers post fixed prices in real stores, and simultaneously list items in online auctions
8 Note that in their paper, BIN auctions include all auctions having the BIN options, which are essentially
the fixed-price and BIN auctions considered in our paper.
9 As can be seen from Table 1 in Hasker and Sickles (2010), there exists a substantial difference in auction
formats adopted by different categories of products.
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(e.g., Etzion et al., 2006 and Bose and Daripa, 2009).
2 Data Description
The data were from eBay auctions of the iPod Nano which started between November
1 and December 31 of 2007, and every auction was observed from its start to its end.
Each observation contained information in three categories: transaction information, price
information, and other information. Transaction information included whether the item
resulted in a sale and, if yes, in what way it was sold. The price information included
starting bid, BIN price posted by the seller, whether there was a secret reserve price, and
the transaction price if there was a sale. Other information included auction formats, auction
characteristics (starting and ending time, sale and posted durations, number of bids, methods
of payment, shipping and handling charge, etc.), product characteristics (generation and
capacity of iPod, whether the item was new, etc.), and seller characteristics (account names,
time as eBay members, reputation, number of feedbacks, etc.).
As is explained in the Introduction, our aim is to investigate why sellers of identical
commodities used different auction formats, together with the differences in the auction
results. For this purpose, we selected from the whole sample those auctions that were as
similar as possible. Specifically, we only included in our data the third generation 4G memory
iPods that were new, and excluded auctions which had secret reserve prices and those for
which certain information was missing in the data-collecting process. Eventually we had
1187 auctions.10
Table 1 reports the basic information of the auction formats and their transaction results.
10 Hammond (2010) also considers identical objects. However, his sample includes both new and used CDs
in differing condition. As a result, he has to control for the CD characteristics in the regressions. Also note
that even CDs with the same physical condition might not be identical, as CDs with different performers
can have different demand.
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We can see that the majority of the auctions were pure auctions (929 in a total of 1187).
There were 178 fixed-price auctions and only 80 BIN auctions. Among the 1187 auctions,
1085 resulted in a sale (sale rate 91.41%), and the average transaction price was $147.48.
Among the items which were sold, 912 were sold with competitive bids,11 147 were sold with
fixed price, and 26 were sold with BIN.
If we look into more details of the transaction results for each of the three auction formats,
we can see that there exists substantial difference. Pure auction had the highest sale rate
of 94.83%, but the lowest transaction price ($140.6). Fixed price auction resulted in the
highest transaction price, at about $157, but took the longest time to reach a sale (about
4.5 days). We also note that although BIN auction did not perform best in either sale rate
or transaction price, it took the shortest time to reach a sale (about 2.7 days). All these
seem to suggest that there exists certain tradeoff between the three auction formats.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of auction characteristics. The BIN auctions had
a much higher starting bid (average $122.6) than the pure auction (average $28). We can
also see that the BIN prices were about the same for the BIN and fixed-price auctions. The
pure and BIN auctions had about the same posted durations (slightly over 3 days), and were
substantially shorter than that for the fixed-price auction (5.6 days).
Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of the sellers. The average number of days the
seller had become an eBay member was the largest for fixed-price auction (1640 days),
followed by pure auction (1534 days) and BIN auction (1469 days). The differences between
these numbers were not significant. This suggests that the time a seller had been an eBay
member is not an important determinant of the auction format adoption decision. There
was, however, a significant difference between the sellers’ reputation. The sellers in the
11 Pure auctions and fixed-price auctions must end with the formats they start with, but BIN auctions
can end with a bidder winning either with competitive bid or BIN. This is because once a bidder places a
bid, BIN disappears and the auction becomes a pure auction.
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fixed-price auctions had the highest average reputation (1293), followed by pure auction
sellers (793) and BIN auction sellers (407). Finally, the pure auction sellers had the largest
average number of items during the period of our study (20), which was not substantially
greater than that for the fixed-price auction sellers (16). But the BIN auction sellers had far
fewer items than the other two (6). This suggests that the number of listings had a certain
relationship with a seller’s incentive to adopt BIN.
All in all, there also exist significant differences in auction characteristics and seller
characteristics across the three auction formats.
3 Empirical Model
In this section we formally build up an empirical model to investigate the causes and con-
sequences of adopting different auction formats for the sellers. We ask two questions: First,
what motivates a seller’s decision to adopt a particular auction format from among the
three? Second, what are the consequences of adopting a particular auction format, as com-
pared with the other two? We first use the whole sample to estimate the following trade
regression:
TRADE∗i = β0 + β1 ·BINi + β2 · FPi + β3 ·Xi + εi,
TRADEi = 1 {TRADE∗i > 0}.
(1)
The left-hand side of (1) is an estimate of whether auction i results in a sale; BINi and FPi
are two dummy variables for whether auction i is a BIN auction (BINi = 1 if yes, and 0
otherwise) or a fixed-price auction (FPi = 1 if yes; otherwise it equals 0); and εi is the error
term.
The vector Xi contains variables that influence the transaction probability of the item.
They include the starting bid (STARTBID), shipping cost (SHIPCOST ), the ratio of
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a seller’s total numbers of positive feedbacks to that of total feedbacks (POSFB; which
we will call the “positive ratio”), and posted duration (DURATION PO).12 The level
of starting bid determines how many potential bidders will actually place bids and, in its
extreme case, whether anyone will bid at all. The higher its value, the more likely that the
item remains unsold. Therefore, we will expect that there is a negative relationship between
the starting bid and the transaction probability, as well as the shipping cost. The positive
ratio is a measure of the seller’s reputation, which has been shown in an enormous amount
of literature to have positive effect on transaction probability.13 The posted duration should
also have a positive relation with transaction probability, as the longer an item is listed, the
more likely that bidders willing to bid and buy will arrive.
Since the adoption of auction format is the endogeneous choice of the sellers, which might
very well depend on the factors that are correlated with transaction probability and price, we
need to find instrumental variables which affect the choice, but not the likelihood and price
of transactions. In a fixed-price auction, the seller has to set a price at which a transaction
must occur. In order to do that, he must be familiar with the market environment (including
product characteristics, current demand for his own commodity and the competing close
substitutes, and how his reputation affects price, etc.) in order to calculate the optimal fixed
price.14 Therefore, we will expect that the sellers who have more experience in the market
are more likely to adopt this format. Although an obvious proxy of the seller’s experience
is the number of days he has joined eBay as a member, it is an imperfect measure, as a
seller might have joined but remained inactive for a long period of time. Another possible
12 All the dependent and independent variables, together with their summary statistics, are listed in Table
4.
13 See survey of literature in Bajari and Hortac¸su (2004) and Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc (2009). A
recent contribution of reputation in online auctions is Livingston (2005).
14 Note that in the BIN auction, the sellers also need to set the optimal BIN price. However, BIN price is
only an upper bound for the transaction price of an item. If the seller does not have enough experience to
calculate the optimal BIN price, he can simply set a high BIN price in order to avoid a mistake. Therefore,
lack of experience does not necessarily preclude a seller from using BIN.
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measure is the reputation score (the total positive feedbacks minus negative feedbacks from
the buyers) of the seller. This is not a perfect measure either, as experience is more related to
the number of transactions a seller has been through, rather than the number of transactions
his buyers are satisfied with. We therefore use the total number of feedbacks a seller has
received (regardless of good or bad) as the measure of the seller’s experience, which in turn is
used as the instrumental variable for the seller’s decision of whether to adopt the fixed-price
format for an item.15 Specifically, we run the following regression:
FP ∗i = γ0 + γ1 · Log(EXPERi) + γ2 ·Xi + vi,
FPi = 1{FP ∗i > 0},
(2)
where Log(EXPERi) is the natural logarithm of seller i’s experience, and vi the error term.
As explained in the Introduction, the theoretical literature has shown that the main
reason for the sellers to adopt the BIN auction is to reduce price risk.16 Given this result,
we hypothesize that the more items a seller has posted during our study period, the more
able he is to reduce (and diversify) price risk through repeated transactions. Consequently,
he faces less price risk, and is less likely to adopt BIN.17 We therefore use the number of
items a seller posted during our study period (LISTNO) as the instrumental variable for
the seller’s decision of whether to adopt the BIN format. Specifically, we run the following
regression:
BIN∗i = θ0 + θ1 · LISTNOi + θ2 ·Xi + ui,
BINi = 1{BIN∗i > 0},
(3)
where ui is the error term.
15 A question arises as to whether it will be the case that our definition of experience is highly correlated
with a seller’s reputation and, since reputation affects transaction probability, experience is also correlated
with transaction probability, making it not a good instrumental variable. This is not the case: In our sample
the correlation between reputation and experience is only 0.05.
16 For example, Chen et al. (2011) has shown that BIN benefits the seller if and only if either the seller
or the bidder is risk-averse.
17 Also note that eBay charges sellers who list more than 50 items per month for using BIN.
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Equations (1), (2) and (3) form a simultaneous probit model and, conditioned on the
value of Xi, we assume that the error terms follow a joint normal distribution:
εi
ui
vi
 ∼ N


0
0
0
 ,

1 ρεu ρεv
1 ρuv
1


.
We use a maximum likelihood estimate model to estimate the value of β’s, θ’s, γ’s and ρεu,
ρεv, ρuv.
We now come to the price and sale duration equations. As transaction price and sale
duration are observable only for items that are sold, we use Heckman’s two-stage estimation
to correct for the sample selection bias in the two equations. Specifically, after substituting
the instrumental variables EXPER and LISTNO into the trade equation, (1) becomes
TRADE∗i = κ0 + κ1 · LISTNOi + κ2 · log(EXPER) + κ3 ·Xi + ηi,
TRADEi = 1 {TRADE∗i > 0}.
(4)
From the estimation of (4) we can construct Mill’s ratio. The regressions for transaction
price and sale duration are then
Log(Pi) = δ0 + δ1 ·BINi + δ2 · FPi + δ3 · Si
+δ4 ·Mill′s ratio+ ωi,
(5)
DURATIONi = α0 + α1 ·BINi + α2 · FPi + α3 ·Hi
+α4 ·Mill′s ratio+ µi
(6)
In equation (5), Si is the vector of variables which influence the transaction price of auction i.
It includes the shopping cost, the posted duration, and the positive ratio for auction i’s seller.
In equation (6), the vector Hi contains variables which influence sale duration. It includes
the starting bid, the posted duration, and the positive ratio of auction i’s seller. Note that
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starting bid actually serves as an open reserve price in an auction. It affects transaction price
only through its influence on transaction probability. That is, a starting bid will not affect
the optimal bid of the bidders, but only prevents the low-valuation bidders from placing bids.
Therefore it affects transaction price only because the average transaction price with starting
bid is the average of the censored bids distribution, rather than original bids distribution.
Therefore, we include starting bid in the transaction probability and duration equations, but
not in the price equation.
4 Results
We first test whether our selection of the instrument variables (LISTNO and EXPER)
is valid. As can be seen from Table 5, the F -values in the weak instrumental variable
test are 4.69 and 8.39 for BIN and FP , and are significant at 5% and 1% statistical levels,
respectively. Moreover, the χ2-value of the endogeneity test is also large and highly significant
(at the 1% statistical level). Both results imply that our choice of the two instrumental
variables is valid. Table 5 also shows that the number of listings (LISTNO) negatively
influences the seller’s tendency to adopt the BIN format (at 5% significance level), and that
the seller’s experience has a positive effect on his incentive to adopt the fixed-price format
(at 1% significance level). These are also consistent with the explanations we propose for
the seller’s adoption of the BIN and fixed-price formats.18 All in all, the results in Table 5
support our hypothesis that the more experienced the sellers are, the more likely they are
to adopt the fixed-price format; and that the more items the sellers have, the less likely are
they to adopt the BIN format. In other words, experience positively influences the sellers’
18 In order to make sure that listing number only affects the choice of buy-it-now, and experience affects
only the choice of fixed-price format, we also run regressions in which both LISTNO and EXPER enter
as dependent variables in (2) and (3). The results are reassuring: LISTNO has no significant influence on
FP , and EXPER has no significant influence on BIN. See Table A1 in the Appendix.
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incentive to adopt the closed-price auction format, while the number of items negatively
influences their tendency to adopt the BIN format.
The second column of Table 5 indicates that the BIN and pure auctions have about the
same transaction probability, while the fixed-price format results in the lowest sale rate.
Therefore, in terms of transaction probability, the fixed-price format performs the worst.
However, this disadvantage is compensated for by its transaction price: As can be seen from
the results of the price regression in the second column of Table 6, fixed-price auction results
in the highest, and pure auction the lowest, transaction price, while BIN auction falls in the
middle. The sale duration regression in the third column shows that pure auction takes the
longest time to result in a sale, followed by the BIN auction, while the fixed-price auction is
the shortest.19
The picture which emerges is that for the three kinds of transaction results (price, sale
rate, and sale duration) we are concerned with, the pure auction and the fixed-price auction
always take the opposite polar positions, while the BIN auction falls in the middle. That
is, the pure auction and the fixed-price auction are polar opposite to each other in trans-
action rates and transaction price, with one format having the highest in one transaction
consequence and the lowest in the other, and the other format just the opposite. The BIN
auction falls in the middle in both transaction rate and price.
Our results strongly suggest that there exists a tradeoff between the three auction for-
19 In Table 6, the coefficient for Mill’s ratio is not significant in either price or duration equation. This
is mainly due to the fact that, in our sample, the transaction rates are very high: 95%, 71% and 83%
for pure, BIN, and fixed-price auction, respectively. In Table A2 of the Appendix, we show the results of
MLE estimation which considers only endogeneity problem without controlling for sample selection bias. All
properties remain similar except that now BIN has the lowest transaction price, which might be because the
sale rate for BIN auction is substantially lower than the other two (see Table 1). This shows that, although
the Mill’s ratios are not significant, it is still necessary to control for the selection bias in order to obtain the
unbiased results for each type of auction. Note that although BIN auction has the lowest sale rate in the
data, our regression shows that, when controlled for other characteristics, its sale rate is among the highest.
This is mainly because (i) the starting bid of the BIN auction is much higher than that of the pure auction
($122.6 vs. $28; see Table 2); and (ii) the positive ratio for the sellers in the fixed-price auction is higher
than that of the BIN auction (0.996 vs. 0.991, significant at 1% statistical level).
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mats. The sellers’ choice of one among the three formats simply reflects their difference
in characteristics and their preference over the price-sale rate tradeoff. When the seller’s
experience and number of listed items are controlled for, the sellers who care more about
transaction price will prefer the fixed-price format, although this at the same time implies
that the sale probability is the lowest. On the other hand, the sellers who care more about
sale probability will opt for the pure auction format. Note that our results also support the
theoretical literature that one of the reasons for adopting BIN is out of risk concern: BIN
auction falls in the middle in transaction price, sale rate, and sale durations. On a more
theoretical level, we can view the sellers as facing a “portfolio selection” problem, in which
they choose between the auction formats in order to balance the tradeoff between transac-
tion probability and sale price. The sellers who view price as more important will choose
the fixed-price format, while those who care more about sale probability will prefer pure or
BIN auctions.
The estimates of other variables are also consistent with the intuition. For example,
shipping cost has a negative effect on both transaction price and transaction rate; starting
bid has a negative effect on transaction probability; and posted duration has a positive
effect on sale duration. The last result requires some explanation. The sale duration is
substantially affected by posted duration, as the latter is an upper bound for the former.
Our result — that pure auction takes the longest time to result in a sale, followed by the
BIN auction, then the fixed-price auction — is actually very intuitive. In a pure auction,
the seller needs to run the full length of posted duration in order to determine the winner.
Therefore, there is no chance of an earlier ending. The fixed-price auction, on the contrary,
allows the bidder to place bid (and end the auction) anytime before it reaches its posted
duration. The BIN auction is halfway between these two formats: Although it allows the
bidder to buy out, once any bidder places a bid, BIN disappears and the auction becomes a
15
pure auction. Therefore, there is certain probability that the auction will run the full length
of the posted duration (if some bidder places a bid), and a certain probability that it will
end earlier (if some bidder buys out). Our result, which controls for the posted duration,
duly reflects the relative expected sale duration for each auction format when their posted
durations are identical.
The posted duration, however, is partially a decision variable of the sellers, and is not
identical.20 In the fourth column of Table 6, we take away the posted duration control in
the sale duration regression, and a different picture emerges. BIN auction now takes the
shortest time to reach a sale, followed by the pure auction, and then the fixed-price auction.
This means that the sellers in the BIN auctions will set the posted durations in a way that,
relative to the other formats, they are earliest to be sold. On the other hand, the sellers in
the fixed-price auctions, given that they set the highest prices, will post the items longer than
the other formats in order to facilitate finding a high-valuation buyer. Our result therefore
also supports the theoretical explanation of the function of BIN in term of time-impatience
(Mathews, 2004), in which the bidders are willing to pay a premium (relative to the pure
auction) to buy out the items before any other interested (but not high-valuation) bidder
enters and places a bid.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
Using eBay auction data of iPods, we empirically investigate the reasons behind the seller’s
strategic choice of auction formats for identical commodities. Our results confirm the hy-
pothesis that more experienced sellers are more likely to adopt the fixed-price auctions, and
that the sellers who have more items are less likely to adopt the BIN format. We also inves-
tigate the differences in transaction results between different auction formats. Our results
20 We say “partially” because eBay allows listing of only 1, 3, 5, 7, or 10 days.
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suggest that there has not been an “optimal” auction format which performs better than the
others, and the choice of auction format appears to be a tradeoff between transaction price
and transaction probability. Our result also suggests that, consistent with theory, both risk
and time-impatience considerations contribute to the adoption of the BIN auction.
A possible concern of our results is that it might be the case that the diversity of formats
adopted by the sellers is simply the result that the same seller, having several identical items
to sell, allocates the items to different formats for reasons unidentified in this paper. This is
not the case: In our data, more than 94% of the sellers, regardless of the number of items
they post, use a single format.
Our data use identical items for study, which enables us to concentrate on a few simple
variables that affect price and transaction probability. It also enables us to identify on
the seller’s characteristics, rather than that of the commodity, that influence the format-
adoption decision. However, this also raises the question of how general our results are.
For this purpose, research with a much larger database comprising a much wider range
of commodities, and using much more complicated econometric techniques, is called for.
As such, our investigation should be viewed as a preliminary attempt at answering the
complicated question of how the sellers frame their strategies in online auctions.
On the other hand, as can be seen from Table 1 in Hasker and Sickles (2010), there
exists substantial difference in auction formats between different categories of commodities.
A promising research venue will be to investigate whether otherwise identical sellers use
different auction formats for different categories of commodities and, if yes, the reason behind
this decision.
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Table 1: Data Description and Summary Statistics of Auction Results
Auction Format All Pure Auction BIN Auction Fixed-Price Auction
Number of items sold with competitive bids 912 881 31 -
Number of items sold with BIN 26 - 26 -
Number of items sold under fixed price 147 - - 147
Number of items resulting in a sale 1085 881 57 147
Number of items not sold 102 48 23 31
Total number 1187 929 80 178
Sales rate 91.41% 94.83% 71.25% 82.58%
Average transaction price (all sold items) $147.477 $140.606 $151.885 $156.982
items sold with competitive bids $145.740 $140.606 $149.563 -
items sold with BIN $154.653 - $154.653 -
items sold with fixed price $156.982 - - $156.982
Average duration (all sold items) 3.293 3.126 2.719 4.517
items sold with competitive bids 3.120 3.126 2.935 -
items sold with BIN 2.462 - 2.462 -
items sold with fixed price 4.517 - - 4.517
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Auction Characteristics
Auction Format All Pure Auction BIN Auction Fixed-Price Auction
Auction Characteristics
Starting Bid (whole sample) $35.248 $27.729 $122.570 -
items sold with competitive bid $27.428 $24.912 $98.929 -
items sold with BIN $130.267 - $130.267 -
items unsold $100.910 $79.432 $145.734 -
BIN Price (whole sample) $159.099 - $160.017 $158.686
items sold with competitive bid $161.820 - $160.820 -
items sold with BIN $157.037 - $157.037 -
items sold with fixed price $157.733 - - $157.733
items unsold $162.534 - $160.955 $153.706
Posted Duration (whole sample) 3.575 3.215 3.325 5.562
items sold with competitive bid 3.138 3.145 2.935 -
items sold with BIN 3.561 - 3.561 -
items sold with fixed price 5.592 - - 5.592
items unsold 4.382 4.500 2.739 5.419
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Seller Characteristics
Auction Format All Pure Auction BIN Auction Fixed-Price Auction
Seller Characteristics
Days as eBay Members 1545.341 1533.778 1468.875 1640.056
items sold with competitive bid 1527.368 1535.142 1306.452 -
items sold with BIN 1736.539 - 1736.539 -
items sold with fixed price 1573.448 - - 1573.448
items unsold 1621.176 1508.750 1385.217 1970.323
Reputation Scores 841.615 792.525 407.038 1293.135
items sold with competitive bid 722.034 740.232 204.871 -
items sold with BIN 283.692 - 283.692 -
items sold with fixed price 1428.293 - - 1428.293
items unsold 1207.520 1752.333 818.966 652.226
Seller’s Number of Listings 18.707 20.259 6.075 16.281
items sold with competitive bid 19.613 20.800 4.484 -
items sold with BIN 5.115 - 5.115 -
items sold with fixed price 18.252 - - 18.252
items unsold 9.069 10.333 9.304 6.935
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Table 4: Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Names of Variables Definitions Mean Standard Error
TRADE Dummy variable which equals 1 if there is a sale, 0.914 0.280
and is 0 otherwise
P Transaction price 147.477 15.143
DURATION Sale duration, days taken to reach a sale 3.329 2.417
BIN A dummy variable which equals 1 if the auction uses 0.067 0.251
BIN format, and is 0 otherwise
FP A dummy variable which equals 1 if the auction uses 0.150 0.357
fixed-price format, and is 0 otherwise
STARTBID Starting bid set by the seller 53.759 67.113
SHIPCOST Shipping cost set by the seller 12.810 46.236
POSFB Ratio of seller’s total amount of positive feedbacks 0.981 0.116
to the total amount of feedbacks
DURATION PO The seller’s posted duration 3.575 2.481
LISTNO The total number of listings by a seller in study period 18.707 27.292
EXPER Total amount of a seller’s feedbacks 850.089 2088.501
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Table 5: Auction Formats and Sales Rate
Dependent Variables
TRADE BIN FP
(1) (2) (3)
Independent Variable
BIN -0.060 - -
(0.266)
FP -0.725*** - -
(0.166)
Log(STARTBID) -0.131*** 0.288*** 6.908***
(0.026) (0.043) (0.689)
Log(SHIPCOST ) -0.028** -0.024** 0.026*
(0.013) (0.010) (0.015)
POSFB 1.003*** 1.336 5.957
(0.349) (1.300) (5.602)
DURATION PO 0.017 -0.125*** 0.157***
(0.026) (0.032) (0.036)
CONSTANT 0.817** -3.083** -41.578***
(0.365) (1.312) (6.360)
ρεu -0.432*** - -
(0.120)
ρεv 0.780*** - -
(0.072)
ρuv -0.721*** - -
(0.073)
Instrumental Variables
LISTNO - -0.023** -
(0.011)
Log(EXPER) - - 0.097***
(0.034)
Weak Instrumental Variable Test - 4.69** 8.39 ***
Endogeneity Test 252.800*** - -
Log likelihood -599.049 - -
Number of Observations 1187 - -
Notes: (a) Standard errors are in parentheses.
(b) ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.
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Table 6: Results on Price and Duration Regressions
Dependent Variables
Log(P ) DURATION DURATION (no control)
(5) (6)
Independent Variables
BIN 0.039*** -0.818*** -1.399***
(0.013) (0.209) (0.226)
FP 0.096*** -0.909*** 0.469**
(0.010) (0.134) (0.268)
Log(STARTBID) - 0.017 0.288***
(0.015) (0.026)
Log(SHIPCOST ) -0.003*** - -
(0.000)
POSFB 0.001 -0.295* -2.096**
(0.023) (0.178) (0.838)
DURATION PO -0.003** 0.954*** -
(0.002) (0.009)
MILL′s RATIO -0.047 -0.519 -2.346***
(0.031) (0.543) (0.877)
CONSTANT 4.994*** 0.472** 5.462***
(0.026) (0.237) (0.878)
Log likelihood 904.532 -1254.020 -2422.250
Number of Observations 1085 1085 1085
Notes: (a) Standard errors are in parentheses.
(b) ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance.
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Appendix (for reference only)
Table A1: Regression Results When Both Instrumental Variables Are Included
Dependent Variables
TRADE BIN FP
(1) (2) (3)
Independent Variable
BIN -0.084 - -
(0.280)
FP -0.674*** - -
(0.171)
Log(STARTBID) -0.132*** 0.291*** 6.785***
(0.027) (0.044) (0.693)
Log(SHIPCOST ) -0.029** -0.023** 0.024
(0.014) (0.010) (0.015)
POSFB 0.992*** 1.824 7.428
(0.350) (1.484) (5.998)
DURATION PO 0.013 -0.125*** 0.163***
(0.026) (0.032) (0.038)
CONSTANT 0.845** -3.473** -42.507***
(0.366) (1.427) (6.676)
ρεu -0.418*** - -
(0.129)
ρεv 0.746*** - -
(0.081)
ρuv -0.728*** - -
(0.073)
Instrumental Variables
LISTNO - -0.022* 0.009
(0.011) (0.008)
Log(EXPER) - -0.023 0.094***
(0.036) (0.036)
Weak Instrumental Variable Test - 5.85* 9.63 ***
Endogeneity Test 104.753*** - -
Log likelihood -597.818 - -
Number of Observations 1187 - -
Notes: (a) Standard errors are in parentheses.
(b) ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.
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Table A2: The MLE Estimates for Price and Duration
Dependent Variables
Log(P ) DURATION
(5) (6)
Independent Variables
BIN -0.133*** -0.892***
(0.037) (0.215)
FP 0.106** -0.971***
(0.050) (0.142)
Log(STARTBID) - 0.006
(0.004)
Log(SHIPCOST ) -0.005*** -
(0.000)
POSFB 0.024 -0.131***
(0.036) (0.043)
DURATION PO -0.005* 0.954***
(0.003) (0.012)
CONSTANT 4.978*** 0.259***
(0.036) (0.068)
Log likelihood 386.399 -1482.315
Number of Observations 1085 1085
Notes: (a) Standard errors are in parentheses.
(b) ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.
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